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A D M I R A LT Y 
Are Punitive Damages Available When a Seaman Sues for Unseaworthiness? 
CASE AT A GLANCE  
Seamen who are injured or the estate of a seaman killed on the job typically file a three-count complaint 
against their employers for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness. The 
Supreme Court has held that punitive damages can be awarded for maintenance and cure but not for 
Jones Act negligence. Now, it must decide where unseaworthiness fits. 
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INTRODUCTION
Seamen who are injured or the estate of a seaman killed on 
the job typically ile a three-count complaint against their 
employers for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and 
unseaworthiness. In Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 
(1990), the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§ 30104, prohibits nonpecuniary damages. Because punitive 
damages are nonpecuniary, they are unavailable under the Jones 
Act. (Pecuniary damages compensate the plaintiff for his or her 
losses. Punitive damages are nonpecuniary because they punish 
the defendant without reference to the plaintiff’s losses.)
Following Miles, lower courts split over whether punitive damages 
were available with respect to maintenance and cure claims. In 
Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009), the 
Court held that they were, distinguishing Miles in a 5–4 opinion 
by Justice Clarence Thomas. The same split now has emerged with 
respect to unseaworthiness claims.
ISSUE
Can a court award punitive damages to a seaman who is injured or 
killed due to a ship’s unseaworthiness?
FACTS
On August 30, 2014, Christopher Batterton, a resident of Buena 
Park, California, was employed as a deckhand by The Dutra 
Group (TDG), a marine construction company headquartered in 
San Rafael, California. Batterton was assigned to work on three 
vessels: EM 1106, SCOW 2, and SCOW 3. The EM 1106 was an 
excavator dredge; the SCOW 2 and SCOW 3 were its barges. The 
trio was being used on a marina project near Balboa Park in 
Newport Beach, California.
Batterton was aboard the SCOW 2 while pressurized air was being 
pumped into one of its compartments. During this operation, a 
metal hatch cover blew open, crushing Batterton’s left hand and 
leaving him with permanent injuries. At the time of the accident, 
the compartment lacked an exhaust mechanism. Had it had 
one, the mishap would have been avoided because the exhaust 
mechanism would have relieved the pressure before it got too 
high.
On October 2, 2014, Batterton sued TDG in the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California. In his 
complaint, Batterton asserted claims for maintenance and 
cure, Jones Act negligence, and unseaworthiness. As part of his 
unseaworthiness claim, Batterton asked for punitive damages.
On November 3, 2014, TDG moved to have Batterton’s demand for 
punitive damages struck. According to TDG, such damages are 
unavailable under federal maritime law. For support, TDG cited 
Miles and McBride v. Estis Well Service, LLC, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 
2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015).
On December 15, 2014, Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Walsh denied 
TDG’s motion. See Batterton v. Dutra Group, 2014 WL 12538172 
(C.D. Cal. 2014). Relying on Townsend and Evich v. Morris, 819 
F.2d 256 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987), Judge Walsh 
wrote:
[A]s the Court sees it, Evich’s holding that punitive 
damages are available in unseaworthiness claims under 
general maritime law has never been expressly or 
impliedly overruled. Nor is it clearly irreconcilable with 
Miles or any of the Supreme Court’s other decisions 
since 1987. As such, it is still good law in this circuit.
2014 WL 12538172, at *2.
On January 5, 2015, TDG requested permission to ile an 
interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). On February 6, 2015, Judge Walsh 
certiied the appeal. On November 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed to hear it.
On January 23, 2018, the Ninth Circuit unanimously afirmed 
Judge Walsh. See Batterton v. Dutra Group, 880 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 
2018). In an opinion authored by Senior Circuit Judge Andrew J. 
Kleinfeld, the panel rejected TDG’s argument that Miles prohibits 
the awarding of punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases:
The Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Atlantic 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend speaks broadly: “Historically, 
punitive damages have been available and awarded 
in general maritime actions, including some in 
maintenance and cure.” Unseaworthiness is a general 
maritime cause of action. Townsend reads Miles as 
limiting the availability of damages for loss of society 
and lost future earnings and holds that Miles does not 
limit the availability of punitive damages in maintenance 
and cure cases. By implication, Townsend holds that 
Miles does not limit the availability of remedies in other 
actions “under general maritime law,” which includes 
unseaworthiness claims.
Id. at 1091–92 (footnotes omitted). On May 2, 2018, the Ninth 
Circuit denied TDG’s petition for rehearing.
On August 30, 2018, TDG iled a petition for a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court. On December 7, 2018, the Court agreed 
to hear TDG’s appeal. See The Dutra Group v. Batterton, 139 S. 
Ct. 627 (2018). On January 14, 2019, it granted TDG’s request to 
dispense with printing of the joint appendix. See Dutra Group v. 
Batterton, 2019 WL 177584 (U.S. 2019).
CASE ANALYSIS
Since the 19th century, a seaman injured on the job automatically 
qualiies for maintenance and cure. “Maintenance” covers the 
seaman’s room and board. Under “cure,” the shipowner pays for 
the seaman’s medical treatment. These duties continue until the 
seaman either returns to work or reaches a point of maximum 
medical recovery. Only in rare instances is a shipowner able to 
escape these obligations.
Also since the 19th century, an injured seaman has been able 
to sue a shipowner for “unseaworthiness.” To be successful, 
the seaman must show that the ship was unsafe. Because the 
shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is both absolute 
and nondelegable, the seaman does not need to prove that the 
shipowner was negligent.
In The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), the Supreme Court held 
that seamen could not sue shipowners for negligence. In 1920, 
Congress vitiated this holding by passing the Jones Act. As 
a result, injured seamen now routinely bring a three-count 
complaint for maintenance and cure, Jones Act negligence, and 
unseaworthiness. Collectively, these causes of action are known as 
“The Holy Trinity.”
In the same year that it passed the Jones Act, Congress 
promulgated the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 30301–30308. It permits suits for the death of any person killed 
on the high seas.
In Moragne v. States Marine Line, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), the 
Supreme Court confronted the following facts. A longshoreman 
had been killed in Florida’s territorial waters. As a longshoreman, 
he was not covered by the Jones Act, and because he had died in 
state waters, he was not covered by DOHSA. Due to the wording of 
Florida’s wrongful death act, he also was not covered by state law. 
See Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1968). 
Believing that Moragne’s widow should not be left remediless, 
the Supreme Court held that she could sue under the general 
maritime law (GML), a body of judge-made law. To reach this 
conclusion, the Court overruled its decision in The Harrisburg, 119 
U.S. 199 (1886), which had held that a maritime wrongful death 
suit could not be maintained in the absence of an authorizing 
statute.
These various laws and precedents collided in Miles, a case in 
which a seaman was stabbed to death by a fellow crew member. 
To recover for her loss, Mercedel W. Miles, the decedent’s 
mother, sued the shipowner for Jones Act negligence and 
unseaworthiness, arguing that the shipowner knew, or should 
have known, that the attacker had a propensity for violence.
Because Miles was not economically dependent on her son, she 
sought only “nonpecuniary” damages. The Court irst held that 
both DOHSA and the Jones Act permit only pecuniary damages. It 
then rejected Miles’s argument that nonpecuniary damages are 
recoverable under the GML, reasoning that the GML must conform 
to statutory maritime law:
Cognizant of the constitutional relationship between the 
courts and Congress, we today act in accordance with 
the uniform plan of maritime tort law Congress created 
in DOHSA and the Jones Act. We hold that there is a 
general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death 
of a seaman, but that damages recoverable in such an 
action do not include loss of society. We also hold that a 
general maritime survival action cannot include recovery 
for decedent’s lost future earnings.
498 U.S. at 37.
In Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1046, rehearing denied, 516 U.S. 
1154 (1996), the Fifth Circuit held that punitive damages were 
not available for maintenance and cure claims. In reaching this 
decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on Miles:
[B]ut even if willful behavior is established, the Jones 
Act does not provide for punitive damages. Under the 
Miles uniformity principle, therefore, the same cause 
of action under the general maritime law for the failure 
to pay maintenance and cure cannot provide a punitive 
recovery, even if willfulness is demonstrated.
Id. at 1512 (emphasis in original).
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Guevara was abrogated 14 years later in Townsend. According to 
Justice Thomas:
Because punitive damages have long been an accepted 
remedy under general maritime law, and because 
nothing in the Jones Act altered this understanding, 
such damages for the willful and wanton disregard of 
the maintenance and cure obligation should remain 
available in the appropriate case as a matter of general 
maritime law. Limiting recovery for maintenance and 
cure to whatever is permitted by the Jones Act would 
give greater preemptive effect to the Act than is required 
by its text, Miles, or any of this Court’s other decisions 
interpreting the statute.
557 U.S. at 424–25 (footnote omitted).
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit, again relying on Miles, and using 
the same reasoning as in Guevara, decided that punitive damages 
cannot be awarded for unseaworthiness:
[T]he Court in Townsend recognized that “a seaman’s 
action for maintenance and cure is ‘independent’ and 
‘cumulative’ from other claims such as negligence 
and that the maintenance and cure right is ‘in no 
sense inconsistent with, or an alternative of, the 
right to recover compensatory damages [under the 
Jones Act].’” The Court agreed that “both the Jones 
Act and the unseaworthiness remedies are additional 
to maintenance and cure: the seaman may have 
maintenance and cure and also one of the other two.” 
Unlike the seaman’s remedy for damages based on 
negligence and unseaworthiness, “the Jones Act does 
not address maintenance and cure or its remedy.” 
Thus, in contrast to the action for damages based on 
unseaworthiness, in an action for maintenance and cure 
it is “possible to adhere to the traditional understanding 
of maritime actions and remedies without abridging or 
violating the Jones Act; unlike wrongful-death actions, 
this traditional understanding is not a matter to which 
‘Congress has spoken directly.’”
768 F.3d at 389–90 (footnotes omitted).
In Tabingo v. American Triumph, LLC, 391 P.3d 434 (Wash. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 648 (2018), the Washington State Supreme 
Court disagreed with McBride:
The United States Supreme Court…analyzed Miles in 
Townsend.…While the Court stated that the “reasoning 
of Miles remains sound,” it also noted that the reasoning 
in Miles is not universally applicable. 557 U.S. at 420, 
129 S.Ct. 2561. Because the cause of action in Townsend 
and the remedy sought were both “well established 
before the passage of the Jones Act,” and because 
Congress had not spoken directly to the issue, punitive 
damages for maintenance and cure were appropriate. 
Id. at 420–21, 129 S.Ct. 2561. The Miles rationale did 
not apply. We use that same reasoning here. Claims for 
unseaworthiness predate the Jones Act and are not based 
on a statutory remedy. Further, as noted in Townsend, 
the Jones Act does not directly address damages for 
general maritime claims. Id. at 420, 129 S.Ct. 2561. There 
is no other indication that unseaworthiness should be 
excluded from the general maritime rule. Because of 
this, Miles does not restrict a general maritime claim for 
unseaworthiness.
Id. at 439–40.
As explained above, the Ninth Circuit in Batterton similarly 
rejected McBride:
McBride, a sharply divided Fifth Circuit en banc decision, 
holds that “punitive damages are non-pecuniary losses” 
and therefore may not be recovered under the Jones Act 
or under the general maritime law.…McBride has ive 
extensive and scholarly opinions addressing all sides of 
the question. Six dissenters note that Miles “addressed 
the availability of loss of society damages to non-seamen 
under general maritime law, not punitive damages,” and 
that “Townsend announced the default rule that punitive 
damages are available for actions under the general 
maritime law (such as unseaworthiness).”
…
It is…true, as Dutra argues, that if we were to interpret 
Miles broadly and Townsend narrowly, as the Fifth Circuit 
has in McBride, then we might infer that Miles [prohibits 
punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases]. But we 
would then have to disregard Miles’s statement that the 
Jones Act “does not disturb seamen’s general maritime 
claims for injuries resulting from unseaworthiness.” The 
Fifth Circuit’s leading opinions in McBride are scholarly 
and carefully reasoned, but so are the dissenting 
opinions, which to us are more persuasive.
880 F.3d at 1093, 1095–96 (footnotes omitted).
Thus, just as it had to decide in Townsend whether Miles 
prohibited punitive damages for maintenance and cure claims, 
now in Batterton the Court must decide whether Miles prohibits 
punitive damages for unseaworthiness claims.
SIGNIFICANCE
Punitive damages can greatly enhance a plaintiff’s recovery. Thus, 
defendants routinely try to cut off a plaintiff’s ability to seek them. 
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008), however, the 
Supreme Court, resolving a question that had been long debated, 
held that punitive damages normally are available in maritime 
cases. As a result, it ordered Exxon to pay $500 million in punitive 
damages to the victims of the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill in 
Alaska.
Given Baker and Townsend, as well as Evich, its own pre-Miles 
precedent, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit ruled as it did 
in Batterton. Nevertheless, McBride gives TDG hope, especially if 
one accepts its idea that maintenance and cure is a distinct cause 
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of action, while Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness simply 
give injured seamen two bites at the same apple.
The numerous amicus briefs iled in support of TDG make it clear 
just how eager marine employers are to win this case. Indeed, 
while losing Townsend stung, losing Batterton would sting even 
more. This is because punitive damages are easily avoided when 
it comes to maintenance and cure claims. By simply paying the 
plaintiff in a timely fashion, either with or without a “reservation 
of rights,” the employer does not have to worry about punitive 
damages. Moreover, as maintenance and cure claims are covered 
by workers’ compensation, the employer, in a sense, has prepaid 
them. And most maintenance and cure claims are relatively small. 
This is especially true when it comes to maintenance, which 
courts generally award at a rate of $20–$30 per day.
Unseaworthiness claims, however, cannot be easily guarded 
against. Moreover, when such a claim arises, an insurer may 
decide that the shipowner’s action, or lack of action, has voided 
the policy. Further, a jury is much more likely to award signiicant 
punitive damages for a dangerous ship than for a mishandled 
maintenance and cure payment.
As a result, the amicus briefs iled in support of TDG warn 
that if the industry is forced to pay punitive damages for 
unseaworthiness claims, maritime commerce will be disrupted, 
litigation will increase, and the cost of waterborne goods will soar.
In contrast, Batterton insists that courts must be able to award 
punitive damages to protect seamen from unscrupulous operators:
Petitioner advocates a per se rule that an injured seaman 
can never recover punitive damages under the general 
maritime law doctrine of unseaworthiness, no matter 
how egregious a defendant shipowner’s fault may be. 
Even if a shipowner made a callous decision to send a 
doomed rust-bucket to sea in hopes of collecting on its 
insurance policy, petitioner’s proposed rule would deny 
sailors who survive the inevitable sinking of the vessel 
their right under the general maritime law to seek 
punitive damages—even for their employer’s deliberate 
wrong-doing.
In a few months, we will know which of these arguments the 
Supreme Court inds more compelling.
Robert M. Jarvis is a professor of law at Nova Southeastern 
University and a past editor of the Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce. He can be reached at jarvisb@nova.edu or 
954.873.9173. 
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